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Abstract: 
Integration theories usually either implicitly or explicitly assume that regional 
integration is driven by intraregional economic interdependence, which allows for the 
utilisation of economies of scale or comparative cost advantages within the region. 
However, following the new regionalism of the 1990s, it has become clear that 
regional integration may also be used by the respective member states to improve 
their standing in the global economy, to become more attractive for foreign direct 
investment and development aid, or to be more powerful in international trade 
negotiations. In this paper, we argue that the latter motive is more important for 
developing countries than the former two, because developing countries are more 
dependent on economic relationships with other regions than on those with their 
neighbours. Thus, in order to understand regional integration in the Southern 
hemisphere, integration theory needs to incorporate interregional relationships and 
the resulting positive feedback for regional integration projects among developing 
countries. To support this argument, we present network analyses of intraregional 
and interregional trade of the European Community (EC), the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of Southeast-Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
the Common Market of South America (MERCOSUR) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditional integration theories implicitly or explicitly stress the importance of 
intraregional economic interdependence for the development of regional integration 
projects. For neofunctionalism, interdependence is the necessary transmission belt 
which leads to the spill-over of regional integration from one sector to the other and 
finally to the political sphere (e.g. Haas 1958, 1967, Lindberg 1963, Nye 1971). For 
liberal intergouvernmentalism, asymmetric economic interdependence explains the 
outcomes of treaty negotiations between member states of a regional integration 
project (Moravcsik 1991, 1998). And for institutionalists, interdependence and the 
resulting transnational exchange lead to the need for regional institutions and 
stabilise these institutions by way of positive feedback (Pierson 1996, 2000, 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 2000). These theories 
are based on the economic rationale of intraregional trade and investment, which 
help to utilise comparative cost advantages and economies of scale by increasing 
economic transactions between the member states of a regional integration project 
(Mattli 1999). Accordingly, regional integration occurs in order to reduce barriers to 
trade and investment within the region, and thereby to increase economic growth and 
wealth. However, the problem with these traditional theories is that they concentrate 
on the famous European example of regional integration, and that they cannot simply 
be transferred to other regions, where the structural preconditions of regional 
integration are different. 
 
Scholars who analyse the so-called ‘New Regionalism’ of the 1990s in regions 
other than Europe often stress that states establish regional integration projects in 
order to improve their standing in the global economic system and to reduce their 
dependence on other world regions (Mansfield and Milner 1999, Preusse 2004, 
Schirm 2002). Accordingly, regional integration may help to attract foreign direct 
investment from other world regions (Bende-Nabende 2002, Büthe and Milner 2005, 
Jaumotte 2004), to become more attractive as addressees of development aid 
(Robson 1993), or to increase their power in interregional or multilateral trade 
negotiations and to obtain better access to other regions’ markets (Doctor 2007, 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). These economic gains of regional integration are not 
solely produced within the respective regions, but they result from the reaction of 
other world regions on the respective regional integration project. They are not only 
dependent on economic and political developments within the own region, but also 
on those in other world regions. Thus, it is likely that these gains are less stable, 
because they are influenced by a variety of factors which cannot be controlled by the 
regional integration project. 
 
We argue in this paper that the relative importance of intraregional 
interdependence and interregional dependence differ from region to region – and so 
do the respective gains from regional integration. Most notably, intraregional 
interdependence will be much more important for developed and industrialised 
regions of the northern hemisphere, whereas less developed regions of the southern 
hemisphere are likely to be more dependent on economic relationships with other 
world regions (Mattli 1999). This is due to the fact that the low level of economic 
development and the undiversified production structure of the latter are a huge 
obstacle for intraregional trade. Even if regional integration projects in the South 
abolished all intraregional barriers to trade, the potential to utilise comparative cost 
advantages and economies of scale would be limited, because the respective 
member states do not constitute attractive markets for each other. Thus, regions of 
the South remain dependent on trade with and foreign direct investment or 
development aid from other world regions. In contrast, the potential to utilise 
comparative cost advantages and economies of scale is much larger among more 
developed member states of regions in the North. Thus, the dependence on positive 
reactions from other world regions is much less important for the success and 
development of the respective regional integration projects.  
 
If one aims to grasp not only regional integration in the North, but also in the 
South, one needs to expand existing theories of regional integration to include 
interregional relationships. So far, existing theories of regional integration may be 
able to explain why regional integration in the South is generally less successful than 
in the North – i.e. because there are only few comparative cost advantages and 
economies of scale to be utilised within the respective regions (Mattli 1999) –, but 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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they cannot explain why regional integration is increasingly popular in the South and 
why some of the respective integration schemes at least temporarily show some 
success and integration dynamic. We conclude from our findings that this unforeseen 
success is likely due to positive feedback from other world regions. Thus, regional 
integration in the South may be successful and dynamic as long as it is supported 
from outside (for the example of Southern Africa see Krapohl and Muntschick 2009). 
This marks a huge difference from regional integration in the North, where regional 
integration may become a self-sustaining process, but it also implies that regional 
integration in the South is not necessarily a hopeless effort. 
 
To support our argument, we utilize network analysis and visualization 
techniques (Brandes et al. 1999). As interdependence is basically a relational 
concept, it is appropriate to use relational methods like network analysis. This family 
of techniques is widely used in policy analysis (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Beyers 
and Kerremans 2004). However, for international relations, its potential has yet to be 
discovered (Knoke and Burmeister-May 1990). Thus, our paper is also a 
demonstration of how network analysis may enrich the toolbox of international 
relations. 
 
In the following, we proceed in three steps. Firstly, in the theoretical section, we 
discuss the importance of intraregional interdependence and interregional 
dependence for regional integration, as well as the structural economic preconditions 
for both factors. We hypothesise that the level of economic development within a 
region is the most important factor behind its intraregional interdependence and 
interregional dependence. Secondly, in the empirical section, we present network 
analyses of intraregional and interregional trade flows for five different regional 
integration schemes around the globe. We demonstrate that there are two different 
types of networks in the North and the South, which differ significantly in respect to 
the relative strength of intraregional and interregional economic relationships. Finally, 
in the conclusion, we summarise our findings and point to some consequences for 
regional integration theory. 
 
2. Regional Integration between Interdependence and Dependence 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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We argue that regional integration aims to utilise economic gains within the 
respective region (as is stressed by European integration theories) and in the 
interaction with other world regions (as is implied in many approaches to ‘New 
Regionalism’). Thereby, the relative importance of the two kinds of gains is mainly 
determined by intraregional interdependence between the member states of a region 
and by interregional dependence between the respective region and other world 
regions. The level of economic development in the respective regions is decisive for 
this interdependence or dependence, respectively, because it influences the potential 
to utilise comparative cost advantages and economies of scale within the region. 
Whereas intraregional interdependence is dominant in more developed regions of the 
North, less developed regions in the South are more dependent on their economic 
relationships with other regions.  
 
2.1. Integration Theories and the Inward Orientation of Regional Integration 
 
Despite the habitual debate between different theories of European integration, 
all neofunctionalist, intergovernmental and institutionalist approaches have in 
common that they rest on the assumption of high interregional interdependence in 
Europe and, consequently, a high economic demand for regional integration. The 
highly developed and diversified economies of Europe can profit enormously from 
liberalised intraregional trade and investment. Economic transactions across the 
borders of Europe allow the member states to specialise in the production of some 
goods in order to utilise comparative cost advantages and to use the opportunities of 
a larger Single Market in order to utilise economies of scale (Mattli 1999). These 
gains will be higher, as more barriers to trade and investment are abolished on the 
way from a free trade area to a customs union, a common market and finally an 
economic and monetary union (Balassa 1961). These opportunities for free trade and 
investment lead to the fact that market participants have an interest in market 
liberalisation, and they consequently express their demand for regional integration 
either in their capitals (as it is stressed by intergovernmentalists), or in Brussels or 
Luxembourg directly (as it is stressed by neounctionalists and institutionalists). 
 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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While theories of European integration agree to a great extent on the economic 
demand for integration, they vary considerably in respect to the supply side of 
regional integration and the resulting dynamic of integration projects. On the one 
hand, intergovernmentalists state that regional integration is only provided by the 
member states within intergovernmental negotiations (Moravscik 1991, 1998). Thus, 
economic interests have to be addressed to the respective governments, which then 
represent them at the EU level. Thereby, it is helpful if one of the member states is a 
benevolent hegemon which carries most of the costs of regional integration (Mattli 
1999). On the other hand, neofunctionalists and institutionalists stress the importance 
of regional or even supranational institutions for the supply of regional integration. 
Here, economic demand for regional integration is also directly addressed to regional 
institutions which use this demand in order to push their own interest in strengthening 
regional integration (Hooge 2001, Stone Sweet 2004). In contrast to 
intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism and institutionalism explicitly take a dynamic 
perspective and argue that regional institutions may have positive feedback for 
economic stakeholders, and may further increase economic interdependence within 
the region. This positive feedback provides the opportunity for further regional 
integration in the next round of a never-ending process (Nye 1971, Stone Sweet 
1999). However, regardless of these differences between the theories, it is evident 
that neither intergovernmental negotiations, nor regional institutions would provide 
regional integration in Europe if this were not demanded by economic stakeholders 
from within the region. 
 
2.2 ‘New Regionalism’ and the Outward Orientation of Regional Integration 
 
In contrast to European integration theories, approaches which deal with the 
‘New Regionalism’ of the 1990s usually stress the outward orientation of regional 
integration projects in regions other than Europe (Mansfield and Milner 1999, 
Preusse 2004, Schirm 2002). An integrated region constitutes a larger market and is 
supposed to be more stable in its economic policy, as long as the respective policies 
are protected by credible regional institutions. This makes a reason more attractive 
for economic stakeholders from other world regions. Firstly, foreign direct investment 
becomes more attractive if the produced goods obtain access to a larger regional 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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market, and if investors are protected against member states’ changing economic 
policies by regional institutions (Bende-Nabende 2002, Büthe and Milner 2005, 
Jaumotte 2004). Secondly, a similar logic applies to development aid, which may 
also profit from economies of scale and a stable policy environment within a 
respective regional integration project (Robson 1993). And finally, the member states 
may profit from pooling their bargaining power within a regional integration project 
when they negotiate with other regions, states or international organisations (Doctor 
2007, Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). All in all, integrated regions are deemed to be 
better able to compete with other regions about scarce resources like foreign direct 
investment, development aid or access to other markets. Thus, regional integration 
can be used to improve the region’s standing in the global economy and vis-à-vis 
other world regions.  
 
If integration is used to improve the region’s standing in the global economy and 
vis-à-vis other world regions, the economic gains from integration are not generated 
solely within the respective region, but they merely result from the successful 
interaction with other regions. This has consequences for regional integration theory. 
Firstly, intergovernmentalist approaches regard member states’ interests as 
exogenous to the theory, so that it does not matter which factors shape these 
interests. However, intergovernmentalists need to widen their perspective to interests 
which do not emerge from interaction between the member states, but rather from 
interaction with other world regions. The resulting hypothesis would be that member 
states would have to choose between their regional and their global interests if these 
did not converge. If the global interests were more important, regional integration 
would stop as soon as it ceased to promote these interests. And secondly, 
neofunctionalist and institutionalist approaches are based on the assumption that 
economic stakeholders from within the region provide constant positive feedback in a 
way that regional institutions are strengthened and integration increases. However, if 
the gains from integration result from the reaction of actors in other world regions, 
such a stable interaction between economic stakeholders and regional institutions is 
less likely to emerge. Actors in other world regions are influenced by a variety of 
economic and political considerations, of which the integration project in a specific 
region is only one. Besides, they have much better exit options than if they were 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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located within the respective region. As a result, the positive feedback from other 
world regions on a specific regional integration project is likely to be less stable than 
positive feedback which is generated within the region. Thus, spill-over and 
institutionalisation effects are probably less likely and less stable than in the North.  
 
2.3 Interdependence, Dependence and Economic Development 
 
In this paper, we argue that the relative importance of the inward and outward 
orientation of regional integration results from the regions’ levels of economic 
development and their positions in the global economic system. The more developed 
and diversified the economies of a regional integration project are, the more they 
profit from intraregional trade and investment (Mattli 1999). The diversified 
economies may specialise in the production of different products, and thus may 
utilise comparative cost advantages. Additionally, high economic development 
means that the respective economies are attractive markets and investment goals for 
each other in order to utilise economies of scale. As a result, as long as no excessive 
trade and investment barriers exists, such highly developed regions are distinguished 
by strong intraregional interdependence. In relation to the internal gains from market 
liberalisation, the external gains from the interaction with other world regions are 
likely to be less important, and the integration project is pushed forward by economic 
stakeholders from within the region. 
 
However, if the economies of a regional integration project are less developed 
and diversified, intraregional interdependence is likely to remain weak, even if trade 
barriers are widely abolished. This is due to the fact that less developed economies 
depend mainly on the export of natural resources to more developed regions. They 
do not find customers within their own region, because the less developed 
economies of their neighbours are themselves dependent on the export of natural 
resources and do not have the capacity to process them. As a result, the economies 
of a regional integration project among less developed countries cannot utilise as 
many comparative cost advantages and economies of scale, because they are 
dependent on the export of similar products and do not constitute attractive markets 
for each other. Corresponding to the principle of communicating tubes, the weakness 
Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink  
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of intraregional interdependence leads to the fact that the dependence on economic 
relationships with more developed regions becomes more important. Often, these 
economic partners will be the former colonial rulers who established close economic 
links with their colonies and maintained these relationships after granting these 
colonies independence. Thus, regional integration among developing countries is 
less likely to be pushed by economic stakeholders from within the regions, but is 
more dependent on positive feedback from more developed regions, which are the 
largest consumers of natural resources, and are thus the most important economic 
partners for developing countries. 
 
Our hypothesis for the empirical analysis is that the trade network of regional 
integration projects will fall into two clearly distinguishable clusters: On the one hand, 
there will be the highly developed and diversified economies of the northern 
hemisphere. The member states of these regional integration projects have 
significantly denser economic relationships with each other than with other world 
regions. Thus, regional integration aims to utilise comparative cost advantages and 
economies of scale, and regional integration is pushed by economic stakeholders 
within the region. On the other hand, there will be the less developed regions of the 
southern hemisphere. The member states of these regional integration projects are 
highly dependent on exports to more developed regions in the North. Thus, regional 
integration aims to improve the standing of the respective regions vis-à-vis their 
economic partners, and the success and dynamic of the integration projects in the 
South are likely to be dependent on feedback from other world regions. Regional 
integration in the South may only be effectively pushed by economic stakeholders 
from within the region if regional integration has received positive feedback for quite 
some time, if the participating economies have developed further, and if more 
intraregional interdependence has emerged. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis1 
 
To analyze the hypothesis put forth in the theoretical section, this paper 
compares the intraregional interdependence and interregional interdependence of 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Daniel Rempe for valuable research support during the creation of 
the network graphs. 
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five regional integration projects (the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
NAFTA; the European Union, EU, respectively the European Community, EC; the 
Common Market of Southern America, MERCOSUR; the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, ASEAN; and the Southern African Development Community, SADC). 
Thus, the focus of the analysis is on two northern (EU, or EC and NAFTA,) and three 
southern (ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC) regional integration projects. To provide 
a common ground for comparison, the paper analyzes the regional integration 
projects ten years after their founding, or the begin of deeper economic integration in 
cases where political integration came first (as in the case of ASEAN and SADC). 
Thus, we compare the EC in 1967 with the NAFTA in 2004, the ASEAN in 2002, the 
MERCOSUR in 2002, and the SADC in 2001. Ten years are a reasonable time 
period, because economic and political actors have then had enough time to adjust 
to new regional institutions, and the first signs of regional integration dynamics 
should also be visible. 
 
Concerning the operationalisation of economic interdependence, we use data 
about international trade flows. This data has at least two advantages in comparison 
to other measurements like intraregional and interregional flows of foreign direct 
investments. Firstly, the available trade data is more comprehensive than the data on 
foreign direct investments, as the former includes information about the origins and 
addressees of goods, whereas investment data is only available in a highly 
aggregated manner.2 Secondly, trade data should also reflect, with some time lag, 
the developments of other important indicators. If foreign direct investment increases 
within a region, this should either lead to more intraregional trade in cases where 
investments are market driven, or to more interregional trade in cases where 
investments are driven by the search for cheap labour or natural resources. The 
sources for the trade data are the UN ComTrade (ASEAN, NAFTA, SADC and 
MERCOSUR) and World Trade Flows Data (EC) (Feenstra et al. 2005).3 Following 
the approach of Feenstra et al. (2005), we rely on the reports of importers to assess 
the quantity of trade flows (measured in US$). As some countries are poor reporters 
                                                 
2 See for example the data base on foreign direct investment from the United Nations Trade and 
Development Conference: 
http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx?sCS_referer=&sCS_ChosenLang=en. 
3 http://comtrade.un.org; http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/data/undata/undata.html 
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and data is lacking, we use reports by exporters to fill gaps in the data set. For each 
regional integration project, we gathered data on trade between the members of the 
project (intraregional trade), and trade between the members of the project and the 
three most important extraregional trade partners (interregional trade). Following the 
logic of the theoretical argument, the five regional integration projects should exhibit 
significant differences in the relations between these two kinds of trade flows. 
 
As the argument made in the theoretical section is basically a relational 
argument, the empirical analysis is based on relational methods, namely network 
analysis and network visualization (Scott 2006, Brandes, Kenis and Raab 2006; 
Brandes et al. 1999). These methods have mostly been used in policy analysis 
(Schneider and Kenis 1991, Thurner and Binder 2009), but in international relations, 
the potential of network analysis has not yet been used to its full extent. Apart from 
some applications in the ‘dependencia’ or ‘world system’ school (Knoke and 
Burmeister-May 1990, Snyder and Kick 1978), international relations scholars have 
only seldom used network methods and reasoning. This is surprising, as 
interdependence – a key concept of international relations – is also the cornerstone 
of network analysis. Additionally, the basic logic of network analysis is independent of 
the character of the units, be they individuals, organizations, or states. Network 
theories tend to work relatively well on different levels of analysis (Borgatti and Foster 
2003: 1001, Marsden 1990: 438), and nothing in the logic of network analysis 
precludes its use on states as units. Thus, on the methodological side, this paper is 
an attempt to demonstrate the usefulness of network analysis for international 
relations. 
 
We use visone4  to visualize the trade networks. In order to ensure a structured 
and focused comparison, all network graphs contain the same information. For each 
member state of the respective regional integration project, we plotted the network 
connections to the three most important import and export partners.5 Thus, the 
                                                 
4 www.visone.info 
5 Note that we plotted the three most important import and export partners for each member state. 
Thus, our approach does not imply that each country has only six network connections (three ingoing 
and three outgoing). For example, in the European Community, Germany may be among the three 
most important export partners of the Netherlands, while the imports from the Netherlands do not 
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networks reflect the relations between the respective states and their most important 
partners, as this figures in policymakers’ calculations.  Trade between the external 
partners is omitted for visualization reasons, and because it does not pertain to the 
theoretical argument. The width of the network links (or ‘ties’, in network jargon) 
reflects the intensity of the trade relations. The arrows indicating intra-regional trade 
are depicted using black lines, whereas extra-regional trade is depicted using grey 
lines. Member states of the respective regional integration project are depicted in 
dark blue, whereas external partners appear in light blue. The relative position of 
countries as importers or exporters can be elucidated from the shape of their node 
symbols – the width of the node reflects the amount of imports, whereas the height of 
the nodes reflects the amount of exports (see Graph 3.1).  
 
Graph 3.1: Legend for the Network Graphs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Regional Integration in the North 
 
The two regional integration projects of the northern hemisphere differ widely in 
respect to their integration history, their institutional set up as well as the number and 
relative size of their member states. On the one hand, the European Union (EU) is 
the oldest, most successful and most advanced regional integration project in the 
world. It had already been set up in 1957 by six member states, and it developed 
throughout several rounds of enlargement and treaty amendments until it arrived at 
the full single market of 27 member states and an economic and monetary union of 
16 member states that it represents today. Of all regional integration projects, the EU 
has the strongest and most complex regional institutions, which leads to the fact that 
                                                                                                                                                        
constitute a large portion of German imports. Thus, major trade countries like Germany have more 
than six ingoing and outgoing connections, as the network is also viewed through their partner’s eyes. 
Member of regional 
integration project 
External trade 
partner 
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some scholars call it a political system sui generis, suggesting that it cannot be 
compared to any other international organisation (Jachtenfuchs 1997, for the 
opposite view see Gehring 2002). Nevertheless, in order to compare the European 
example with other, much younger regional integration projects, we choose the EU’s 
predecessor – the EC of 1967, a customs union of six member states – as a 
reference point. On the other hand, the NAFTA was not founded by the four member 
states Canada, Mexico and USA until 1994. It is only a free trade area, and it is not 
expected to integrate any further. The NAFTA’s regional institutions are much weaker 
and less complex than those of the EU (or, in our example, the EC), and only its 
dispute settlement mechanism may develop some independence from 
intergovernmental politics (Abbott 2000, Krapohl et al. 2009). 
 
However, the EU (or rather EC) and the NAFTA are economically rather similar, 
which is the reason why they belong to the same cluster in our analysis. The two 
regions constitute the second largest and the largest market in the world, with 
respective shares of 30%, and 32% of the world gross domestic product in 2006. 
Both regions are highly industrialised and developed, with a per capita gross 
domestic product of 31,047 US$, and 34,593 US$, respectively, in 2006.6 As a result, 
the economies of both regions should be able to utilise significant comparative cost 
advantages and economies of scale by intraregional trade, whereas interregional 
dependence should be much lower and less important than intraregional 
interdependence. Nevertheless, two qualifications have to be added to this general 
picture. Firstly, in the following analysis, we do not analyse the EU as it is today, but 
the EC of 1967. At this time, the respective regional market was much smaller and 
the economic development not as advanced as it is today. Besides, the 1960s were 
the time of relatively closed national economies, as well as the time of the 
Luxembourg compromise and the following Eurosclerosis, which hampered 
European integration (Dinan 2005). As a result, intraregional interdependence should 
be much higher today than in the 1960s, and if we find that intraregional 
interdependence was nevertheless dominant at this time, this should hold even truer 
today. And secondly, the NAFTA is distinguished by an asymmetry between two 
                                                 
6 The numbers are taken from the Regional Integration Knowledge System (RIKS) of the United 
Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-Cris), 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/riks/web/, 25.5.2009. 
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highly developed economies (Canada and the USA) and one emerging market 
(Mexico, which had a gross domestic product of only 9,104 US$ in 2006). However, it 
is especially this asymmetry which allows the member states to utilise comparative 
cost advantages and economies of scale. Whereas the USA profits from cheap 
labour in Mexico, Mexico itself gains enormously from easy access to the large 
market of the USA (Schirm 1997). Thus, although the NAFTA includes one less 
developed economy, it should nevertheless fit into the cluster of regional integration 
among developed economies, because it is the difference in development which 
should lead to intraregional interdependence. 
 
Graph 3.2: Trade Network of the EC in 1967 
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Graph 3.3: Trade Network of the NAFTA in 2004 
 
When analysing the trade networks of the EC and the NAFTA (see Graphs 3.2 
and 3.3), it becomes visible that both regions are based on dense networks of 
intraregional trade. In fact, intraregional trade is more important for the two regions 
than trade with any external trade partner. This becomes more apparent in the case 
of the EC with six member states than within the NAFTA with only three member 
states, but in both graphs, the ties between economies of the regional integration 
project are more important than the ties to other regions. The small size of the 
extraregional trade partners in comparison to the member states is another indicator 
that the former are not as important for the regions’ trade as the latter. Although only 
21% of all EC exports remained within the region in 1967,7 this value has more than 
tripled to roughly 70% in the EU today. Within the NAFTA, approximately 50% of 
exports remain within the region.8  
 
It also becomes clear that the intraregional interdependence of both regions is 
largely based on trade with one member state of the respective integration project. In 
                                                 
7 This number is calculated from our database on intraregional and interregional trade, which is also 
the basis of the network graph. 
8 WTO International Trade Statistics 2008: World Trade Developments in 2007, 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2008_e/its08_world_trade_dev_e.pdf, 30/12/2008. 
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the EC, this is Germany, and in the NAFTA, it is the USA. Besides, these two 
powerful actors have strong economic relationships with extraregional trade partners. 
This makes the USA one of Germany’s most important export markets, and the EU 
one of the USA’s most important trade partners. However, in sum, the intraregional 
trade flows are clearly more important for Germany and the USA than the trade with 
extraregional economies. Thus, both states should have a clear interest in regional 
integration in order to liberalise and stabilise trade with their respective neighbours. 
Additionally, for the smaller states in the integration project (see e.g. the network ties 
of Belgium, Canada, or Italy), the more important trade partners are internal partners 
as well. Thus, their interest should also be in further integration. 
 
To sum up, the two regional integration projects in Europe and North America 
are distinguished by a high level of economic interdependence of their member 
states. This demonstrates that the two highly developed and industrialised regions 
are able to profit from comparative cost advantages and economies of scale which 
are created within the respective regions. In comparison, trade with economies from 
other world regions is much less important, and it is only significant for the two trade 
giants Germany, and the USA. But still, these two powerful states should have a 
strong interest in regional integration, as their intarregional trade is in sum more 
important than their trade with any extraregional partner. One may conclude that 
regional integration in the EC and the NAFTA is largely driven by the desire to 
liberalise and stabilise the important intraregional trade flows. Thus, integration 
should be relatively stable and regional institutionalisation should occur even within 
the small limits left by the institutional design of the NAFTA (Krapohl et al. 2009). In 
contrast, interregional relationships should have much less influence on the success 
of integration in these two regions. 
 
3.2 Regional Integration in the South 
 
Like in the northern hemisphere, the regional integration projects in the South 
show a large variety of integration histories and institutional set ups, as well as 
number and size of member states. Whereas the MERCOSUR was newly founded in 
1992 and became an incomplete customs union during the 1990s, the ASEAN and 
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the SADC look back on a longer history, but they began with economic integration 
towards free trade areas only in 1992, and 1991, respectively. In the course of time, 
all three integration projects experienced some enlargement, and today, the ASEAN 
includes ten, the MERCOSUR five9 and the SADC 1510 member states. None of the 
three integration projects has supranational institutions comparable to those of the 
EU, but despite this fact, the strength of their regional institutions varies widely. The 
regional institutions of the MERCOSUR are probably the strongest and most 
complex, as they include several intergovernmental bodies, a secretariat, a 
parliamentary assembly and a dispute settlement mechanism with a permanent 
review tribunal (Krapohl et al. 2009). Next is the SADC, which also has a secretariat 
to support intergovernmental bodies and a tribunal, but the latter has so far been 
used only once (Vogt 2007). The ASEAN has only a secretariat and is solely based 
on intergovernmental decisions during summits or ministerial meetings (Ufen 2005). 
 
The three regions of the southern hemisphere constitute much smaller markets, 
and their economies are much less developed than those in the North. Together, the 
ASEAN, the MERCOSUR and the SADC produced only 6% of the world gross 
domestic product in 2006, whereas their population counted for 16% of the world 
population. The per capita gross domestic product in 2006 varied between 1,854 
US$ in the SADC,  1,913 US$ in the ASEAN and 5,660 US$ in the MERCOSUR. 
However, these aggregated numbers conceal some fundamental asymmetries within 
and between the regions. For example, in 2006, the per capita gross domestic 
product was only 141 US$ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but 5,923 US$ 
in Botswana; 514 US$ in Cambodia, but 31,028 in Singapore; and 1,542 US$ in 
Paraguay, but 5,663 US$ in Brazil.11 Despite these asymmetries, it is unlikely that 
intraregional production networks like in the NAFTA will also emerge in the South. 
The general level of development is much lower, and the economies of the three 
regions are not diversified, but depend to a large degree on the export of natural 
resources and primary commodities, which are not extensively needed by their 
                                                 
9 However, the accession of Venezuela has yet to be ratified by Brazil. The following empirical 
analysis is based on the MERCOSUR of 2002, when Venezuela was not a member state. 
10 The following empirical analysis is based on the SADC of 2001, when the Seychelles were not a 
member state. 
11 The numbers are taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=135, 26/5/2009. 
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neighbours. Thus, the economies of the member states are unlikely to be able to 
utilise significant comparative cost advantages and economies of scale by way of 
intraregional trade. Instead, the main addressees of their exports are likely to be 
regions in the North or emerging markets like China, which need the natural 
resources and primary commodities, and which have enough industrial capacity to 
process them further. As a result, we expect that interregional trade is much more 
important for the ASEAN, the MERCOSUR and the SADC than it is for the EU (or 
rather the EC) and the NAFTA. This does not exclude the possibility that intraregional 
trade may be significant for some smaller member states which trade heavily with 
local trade giants such as Brazil, Singapore or South Africa, but in sum, this 
intraregional trade should be outnumbered by interregional trade with more 
developed regions in the North. 
 
Graph 3.4: Trade Network of the MERCOSUR in 2002 
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Graph 3.5: Trade Network of the ASEAN in 2002 
 
 
Graph 3.6: Trade Network of the SADC in 2001 
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It becomes clearly visible from the trade networks of the ASEAN, the 
MERCOSUR and the SADC (see Graphs 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6) that the regional 
integration projects in the South fundamentally differ from those in the North. 
Generally, the grey ties, which indicate interregional relationships with the three most 
important external trade partners, outbalance in both number and importance the 
black ties, which indicate intraregional trade. This becomes more visible in the less 
developed regions of the ASEAN and the SADC, where intraregional connections are 
insignificant in comparison to trade with the EU or with China, Japan and South 
Korea, which, together with the ASEAN, constitute the so-called ASEAN+3 countries 
(Nabers 2005). But even for the somewhat more developed region of the 
MERCOSUR, trade with the EU and the USA is more important than trade between 
Brasil and Argentina, not to mention trade with the two smaller member states 
Paraguay and Uruguay. The importance of interregional trade also manifests itself in 
the size of the extraregional trade partners which are depicted in light blue. For the 
SADC member states, the EU alone is the dominant trade partner within and outside 
of Southern Africa. For the ASEAN member states, Northeast Asia is the most 
important export market and supplier of import goods. And For the MERCOSUR, 
interregional trade is split between the EU and the USA. In contrast, intraregional 
trade counts for only 25% of all exports in the ASEAN, for 14% of all exports in the 
MERCOSUR and for 12% of all exports in the SADC (Krapohl and Muntschick 2009). 
Thus, interregional trade is much more important for the three regional integration 
projects than intraregional trade between their respective member states.  
 
Despite the general dominance of interregional trade between regional 
integration projects in the South and more developed regions of the North, there also 
exist some significant intraregional trade flows around the regional trade giants 
Singapore, Brazil and South Africa. Like in the EU and the NAFTA, intraregional 
trade within the ASEAN, the MERCOSUR and the SADC is also largely based on the 
trade with only one member state (this is most obvious in the case of the SADC; 
Krapohl und Muntschick 2009). Thus, these regional giants could become 
‘benevolent hegemons’, which would, in their own interests, supply regional 
integration for the whole region (Mattli 1999). However, in contrast to Germany and 
the USA, Brazil, Singapore and South Africa should have much less interest in 
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carrying the burdens of regional integration, because they have far fewer economic 
interests within the region. Whereas the own region is the most important trade 
partner for Germany and the USA, this is not the case for Brazil, Singapore and 
South Africa. Most Brazilian exports are shipped to the EU and the USA, Singapore 
trades most with Northeast Asia and the USA, whereas South Africa has an 
overwhelming interest in trade with the EU. Even if the economic relationships with 
the regional giants are significant for the smaller member states of the respective 
regional integration projects, this is not the case for the giants themselves. Thus, the 
dominance of interregional over intraregional trade in regions of the South is reflected 
within the trade of their potential hegemons, which are consequently unlikely to 
supply the club with good regional integration at their own expense.  
 
Both within SADC and ASEAN, there are smaller member states that – 
according to their trade structure – are only weakly linked to all other member states. 
Consider for example the Philippines or Lesotho. From the perspective of the 
regional integration project, they are ‘outliers’ in the truest sense of the word, as their 
most important trade connections are to the North. Compare for example the 
structural network position of Belgium (Graph 3.1) to that of the Philippines (Graph 
3.5). Belgium is integrated in the European trade network and has stakes in these 
trade relations, while the Philippines’ most important partners are outside the region. 
Thus, the Philippines’ interest (like the interests of comparable countries) cannot be 
to focus on regional trade, but to strengthen their standing vis-à-vis external partners.  
 
To sum up, the member states of the three regional integration projects in South 
America, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa are more dependent on trade with 
other world regions than on trade with their respective neighbours. Intraregional trade 
is only important for the regions’ smaller states, but the regional trade giants, which 
should carry a large part of the burden of regional integration, trade more with other 
world regions than with their neighbours. Generally, the economies in the South are 
too small and too underdeveloped to utilise comparative cost advantages and 
economies of scale on a significant scale within the respective regions. Thus, the 
ASEAN, the MERCOSUR and the SADC are highly dependent on the export of 
natural resources and primary commodities to the North, i.e. to the EU, North 
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America and Northeast Asia. One may thus conclude that regional integration is a 
way to improve the regions’ standing vis-à-vis their extraregional trade partners. This 
also includes that the success and dynamics of the respective integration projects 
should, to a large extent, be dependent on the feedback of these extraregional 
partners. If regional integration in the South leads to increasing foreign direct 
investment, more development aid or better access to other regions’ markets, 
regional integration will be reinforced. However, if external feedback is less positive 
or unstable, regional integration may be disturbed.  
 
4. Conclusion and Consequences for Integration Theory 
 
The analysis of trade networks in Europe, North America, South America, 
Southeast Asia and Southern Africa demonstrated that the respective regions fall into 
two clearly distinguishable clusters. On the one hand, there are the highly developed 
and industrialised regions of the North, which constitute enormously large markets 
with high gross domestic products. The member states of the EU and the NAFTA can 
profit significantly from liberalised intraregional trade, because this allows them to 
exploit comparative cost advantages and economies of scale. These regions are 
distinguished by a dominance of intraregional trade flows, whereas exports to other 
regions are comparatively less important for them. On the other hand, there are the 
less developed and industrialised regions of the South, which constitute much 
smaller markets with low or very low gross domestic products. The member states of 
the ASEAN, the MERCOSUR and the SADC cannot profit as much from intraregional 
trade, because the potential to utilise comparative cost advantages and economies of 
scale is low and would be low even if all trade barriers were abolished. The member 
states of these regions are much more dependent on exports to other world regions, 
whereas intraregional trade is much less important for them. 
 
This finding implies that the positive feedback for regional integration needs to 
be generated in different ways in regions of the North and the South. As European 
integration theories usually stress, positive feedback for regional integration in the 
North is provided by the regions themselves. Economic actors profit from the 
abolishment of trade barriers and the liberalised intraregional trade, and thus, they 
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will push the regional integration process forward. In contrast, regional integration 
needs to receive positive feedback from other world regions in order to be 
successful. Regional integration is not a self-sustaining process as in the North, but 
needs to be supported from outside. For example, economic and political actors in 
other world regions need to decide whether to invest more, whether to give more 
development aid or whether to grant better access to their markets if regions in the 
South decide to integrate. However, these extraregional actors are influenced by a 
variety of different political and economic factors, and they have good exit options; 
i.e. they may easily decide not to engage in the respective regions of the South. 
Thus, the positive feedback from other world regions is likely to be less stable than 
positive feedback, which is generated within the own region. Although regional 
integration in the South is not a hopeless task, it is nevertheless likely to be less 
stable than in the North. 
 
As a result, if regional integration theories aim to also address regional 
integration in the South, they have to include interregional relationships in their 
theoretical framework. Intergovernementalists could do this by opening up their 
analysis of member states’ interests. Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism usually 
focuses on economic interdependence when analysing interests, it has to ask what 
influence interregional relations have on the interests of the member states if it aims 
to analyse regions of the South. If both interregional and intraregional factors favour 
regional integration, the respective integration projects are likely to be successful and 
to develop further. However, if interregional factors do not support regional 
integration, they may hinder the integration process, even if intraregional factors point 
in the other direction. And neofunctionalists and institutionalists have to ask how the 
dependence on extraregional feedback influences spill-over and institutionalisation 
processes. Such processes are usually assumed to depend to a large extent on 
constant positive feedback for regional institutions from within the region. If this 
feedback comes from outside the region and is less stable, a steady interaction 
between economic interests and regional institutions is less likely to emerge. Thus, 
spill-over and institutionalisation processes are less likely to emerge or to be stable. 
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